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This paper explores the impact of the exchange rate regime on inflation and output in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU candidate countries. The panel estimations for the 
period between 1994 and 2002 show that de facto measures of exchange rate stability have a 
better explanatory power than the de jure measures in the inflation and growth equations. For 
the whole observation period the estimations reveal a significant impact of exchange rate 
stability on low inflation as well as a highly significant positive impact of exchange stability 
on real growth. When sub-dividing the period into a “high-inflation” period (1994-1997) and 
a “low-inflation period” (1998-2002) and when removing outliers from the sample, the 
evidence in favour of a positive association between exchange rate stability and inflation gets 
weaker. The association of exchange rate stability with higher real growth remains quite 
robust. Thus our findings can be interpreted to mean that membership of the CEE countries in 
the European Monetary Union would have a positive impact on these countries’ growth rates.  
JEL classification: F31. 
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 1. Introduction 
In the very near future eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries will join the European 
Union (EU). Bulgaria and Romania are expected to follow by 2007. The eastern enlargement of the 
European Union heralds the enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Within a few 
years the EMU could grow to a size of up to 25 member states. 
  The possible enlargement of the European Monetary Union raises the question of its costs 
and benefits. Is the EU25 an optimum currency area? The traditional theoretical framework of 
optimum currency areas (OCA) as developed by Mundell (1961)—henceforth Mundell I—leads to 
scepticism. As heterogeneity will increase within the EMU25, the probability of asymmetric shocks 
will rise. In the perspective of Mundell I one may come to the conclusion that it is not in the interest 
of the enlarged EU to embark on a monetary union.  
  Nevertheless, several CEE countries have expressed their strong intention to join the EMU 
as soon as possible (Backé and Thimann 2004). The rationale in favour of an early EMU 
membership is to be found outside the traditional OCA framework. As stressed in some of 
Mundell’s (1973a and 1973b) later papers, in a world of non-stationary expectations, exchange rate 
movements do not function as stabilizing instruments in the face asymmetric shocks. Instead they 
are likely to be an independent source of volatility. In this view, which we label Mundell II, an early 
EMU membership could be the optimal choice. 
  Which framework applies for the CEE countries? Mundell I or Mundell II? Should the CEE 
countries maintain their monetary independence as long as possible to cope with asymmetric shocks 
during their economic catch-up process? Or should they join the EMU quickly to reap the benefits 
of irrevocably fixed exchange rates?   
  This paper adds to this discussion by measuring the impact of exchange rate stability on 
inflation and output growth in the CEE countries. If fixed exchange rates contribute to low inflation 
and high growth, EMU enlargement could be seen as providing a source of benefits for its 
prospective members. We will use a panel data approach to perform this analysis.  
1.    Costs and Benefits of Entering the Eurozone: Mundell I versus Mundell II 
The decision of the new CEE member states when to enter the European Monetary Union will 
depend on the perceived costs and benefits. The traditional theory of optimum currency areas as put 
forward by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) has relied on three criteria to make an 
assessment about the costs and benefits of a monetary union: asymmetry, flexibility and openness 
(integration).  
  3  The seminal paper by Mundell (1961) on optimum currency areas focused on asymmetric 
shocks and flexibility of labour markets. Assuming sticky prices and wages, Mundell analysed the 
macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms of demand shifts between regions (countries). Within this 
Keynesian framework, Mundell concluded that countries which face large asymmetric would find it 
costly to loose their monetary and exchange rate policies when entering a monetary union. These 
costs, however, would be reduced if these countries were characterised by wage flexibility and 
labour mobility.   
  The analysis presented by Mundell (1961) led to scepticism about the desirability of forming 
a monetary union among countries, which experience large asymmetric shocks and lack labour 
market flexibility.  We represent this Mundell I analysis in the left panel of Figure 1.
1 On the 
vertical axis we set out the degree of asymmetry of shocks among clusters of countries; on the 
vertical axis we present the degree of flexibility of the labour markets in these countries. The OCA 
line represents the combinations of asymmetry and flexibility for which the costs of a monetary 
union equal the benefits. This is a positively sloped line because an increase in asymmetry increases 
the costs of a monetary union. As a result, in order to keep the costs equal to the benefits, flexibility 
must increase.  When countries are located to the right of the OCA-line the benefits of the union 
exceed the costs. These countries form an optimal currency area. The opposite holds when countries 
are located to the left of the OCA-line.   
  McKinnon (1963) introduced the degree of openness as an additional variable affecting the 
costs and benefits of a monetary union. More particularly it can be shown that as the degree of 
openness, increases the benefits of a monetary union also increase. These benefits arise from the 
fact that the elimination of exchange rate variability reduces transactions costs and the volatility of 
domestic prices. These beneficial effects are likely to increase with the degree of openness of 
countries.  
  The right panel of Figure 1 analyses the costs and benefits of a monetary union based on 
these insights. We set the degree of openness of countries on the horizontal axis. The OCA-line 
gives the combinations of asymmetry and openness for which the costs and the benefits of a 
monetary union are equal. It is positively sloped because when asymmetry increases (which raises 
the costs) one needs an increase in openness (which raises the benefits) to keep costs and benefits in 
balance. Countries on the right hand side of the OCA-line will find it beneficial to be in a monetary 
union. They form an optimal currency area. 
    Where should be located the EMU25—which would include all EU accession countries as 
well as the present “outs” Denmark, Sweden and UK— in Figure 1? The empirical evidence is most 
                                                 
1 For more detail about this graphical representation see De Grauwe (2003). 
  4clear-cut for openness. Figure 2 shows the exports to the EU15 as percent of GDP for four groups 
of countries: the twelve present EMU members, the three EMU “outs”, the ten CEE potential EMU 
member states (including Romania and Bulgaria) as well as Cyprus and Malta. 
In the year 2002 trade to the EU15 as percentage of GDP was higher for the CEE countries 
than for the present EMU members.
2 Exports to the EU as percentage of GDP averaged 26.6% for 
the CEE countries in comparison with 20.9% for the EMU member states. Trade integration with 
the EU15 is stronger for the CEE countries than for the EMU “outs” Denmark, Sweden and UK 
(13.3% on average). Thus, based on McKinnon’s (1961) openness criterion the Central and Eastern 
European countries seem to pass the OCA-test.  
  The degree of asymmetric shocks is more difficult to quantify. More than a decade ago, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) used a VAR methodology as proposed by Blanchard and Quah 
(1989), to measure asymmetric shocks in the potential first wave of EMU member states. Based on 
the assumption that demand shocks are temporary and supply shocks are persistent Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993: 221-222) concluded that “a strong distinction emerges between supply shocks 
affecting the countries at the centre of the European Community—Germany, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Denmark—and the very different supply shocks affecting other EC members—the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece.”   
  What is the evidence about the degree of asymmetry in the group of countries comprising 
the Central and Eastern European countries? Buiter and Grafe (2002) who analyse the heterogeneity 
of national incomes structures and co-movements of inventory cycles find evidence that CEE 
business cycles are by no means being synchronized with the EU15. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2002) 
use the VAR framework by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to show that for the most accession 
countries the shocks are significantly more idiosyncratic with regard to the EU25 than for the EU15. 
Least is known about the flexibility of labour markets in the EU25. Riboud, Sánchez-
Páramo and Silva-Jáuregui (2002) analyse labour market flexibility in six CEE countries during the 
1990s. They conclude that in comparison to the other OECD countries the CEE countries (in 
average) range in the middle, exhibiting more flexibility than France or Germany but less than the 
United States and the United Kingdom. A panel study by Alvarez-Plata, Brückner and Siliverstovs 
(2003) of the potential migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU15 predicts 
considerable movement of labour force from the CEE countries into Germany and other EU15 
countries.  
                                                 
2   Membership in a currency union is expected to increase trade integration among the members (Frankel and Rose 
1998). Micco, Stein and  Ordoñez (2003) argue that EMU membership has increased bilateral trade between the 
present members considerably compared with trade with the non-EMU countries. 
  5   All in all, the empirical evidence seems to be mixed. Trade integration of the CEE countries 
with the rest of the union well advances. However, the degree of asymmetry of shocks appears to be 
relatively high, while flexibility is not particularly strong. All this suggests that is not unreasonable 
to conclude that the EU25 would not at this moment constitute an optimal currency area.  On the 
basis of this analysis, the Deutsche Bundesbank (2003: 19) concluded that a high degree of 
exchange rate flexibility might be the better choice for the CEE countries thereby suggesting a 
“careful timing” of EMU accession. In this view, the CEE countries would be well advised to 
postpone EMU membership—at least if the traditional OCA criteria are considered.  
  The previous analysis was based on what we have labelled Mundell I, which is a very 
Keynesian framework assuming fixed prices and wages. The view we have from the later work of 
Mundell (1973a and 1973b) which we labelled Mundell II is very different (McKinnon 2003). In 
Mundell II exchange rate movements do not play the role of stabilizing the economy in the face of 
asymmetric shocks. Instead, these exchange rate movements are independent sources of volatility. 
The reason is that foreign exchange markets are not efficient. They are dominated by a speculative 
dynamics that lead to exchange rate movements unconnected from movements in the fundamentals.  
  As a result, exchange rates exhibit excess volatility and are a source of great macroeconomic 
volatility, especially in small open economies.  In this Mundell II world it will generally be 
beneficial for small open economies which allow the free movement to capital to fix their exchange 
rates as a way to avoid the disruptive macroeconomic effects of floating exchange rates. Since, in 
addition, pegged exchange rates are fragile and subject to crises, these countries will find it 
advantageous to join a monetary union so as to permanently fix their exchange rates.  
In the following sections we take up the issue raised by Mundell II and analyse the extent to 
which the CEE accession countries have created a better environment for trade, capital flows and 
growth by stabilizing their exchange rates. This will allow us to shed light on the question of 
whether  Mundell I or Mundell II is the appropriate framework for the new member states who are 
close to enter EMU? 
2.  Sample Selection, Volatility Measures, Sub-Periods 
 
We use a panel of ten CEE countries to analyse how inflation and economic growth in the CEE 
countries have been affected by the exchange rate regime. Given the short observation period, 
which is available for the transition economies, country-specific regressions would not provide 
enough degrees of freedom.  Even for a panel of 10 countries a nine-year sample period with a 
maximum of 90 observations could be criticised as being too short. Nevertheless, it can give us a 
  6valuable insight in the cost and benefits of EMU membership of the CEE countries by exploring 




Our sample consists of the CEE (potential) EU accession countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the “latecomers” 
Bulgaria and Romania. Since the macroeconomic data for the cross-country panel are incomplete 
prior to 1993, the observation period starts in 1994 and continues up to the present (2002). 
 
Volatility Measures  
 
When measuring the impact of the exchange rate regime on inflation and growth, one of the most 
important decisions to be made is the choice of the underlying definition of exchange rate stability. 
In practice, exchange rate arrangements can seldom be subdivided into fully pegged or fully flexible 
regimes, but they cover a broad variety of “intermediate” regimes. In addition—as stressed by a 
growing literature such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2002: 32), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2002), McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) and Schnabl (2003)—the official 
announcements of (de jure) exchange rate arrangements might differ from de facto exchange rate 
policies.    
  Official IMF classifications of exchange rate arrangements as published by the IMF Annual 
Reports on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions have the advantage of 
providing a measure for the commitment by the monetary authorities in favour of specified 
exchange rate targets. The IMF classifies de jure exchange rate arrangements into eight groups with 
a rising degree of exchange rate flexibility. As shown in Table 1 the official IMF classifications 
range from exchange rate arrangements without separate legal tender (dollarization or euroization) 
up to independent floating. These eight classifications are generally sub-divided into fixed exchange 
rate arrangements (1 and 2), intermediate exchange rate arrangements (3 to 6) and flexible exchange 
rate arrangements (7 and 8) (Fischer 2001: 3-4).  
While  de jure exchange rate classifications emphasize the “signalling effect for 
expectations”, they depend on the country’s ex ante self-assessment of the exchange rate regime.
3 
As a result, they might fail to control for a possible discrepancy between de jure and de facto 
regimes. Such a discrepancy often arises when “fear of floating” exists, leading countries to pursue 
exchange rate stabilization even when they declare their exchange rate regime to be flexible. In this 
case exchange rate flexibility will be less than suggested by official classifications. Although de 
                                                 
3   De jure exchange rate classifications might be closer to an ex ante declaration of the exchange rate regime and thus 
be less vulnerable to the possible endogeneity bias as discussed below.  
  7facto measures for exchange rate volatility suffer from a variety of shortcomings such as their 
backward looking nature, they have been used should provide useful information with respect to the 
impact of exchange rate stability on macroeconomic stability.  
The methodologies to identify de facto exchange rate regimes use a combination of several 
indicators, i.e., observed exchange rate volatility, percentage changes in foreign reserves and 
absolute changes in nominal interest rates (Calvo and Reinhart (2002) or Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002)). We focus on observed exchange rate volatility as an indicator for exchange 
rate stabilization.
4 
    To measure the observed exchange rate volatility the adequate reference currency has to be 
chosen. Up to 1997/98 the German Mark (DM) and the US dollar competed as anchor currencies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Some countries pegged their currencies to the dollar, others to the DM 
or to currencies baskets with a broad variety of (European) currencies. With the introduction of the 
euro in 1999 and the approaching EU accession of the CEE countries the euro has become the 
dominant anchor currency in Central and Eastern Europe (Schnabl 2003). 
  To satisfy both the role of the euro (DM) and the dollar as anchor currencies in Central and 
Eastern Europe we proceed in two steps. First, we calculate a measure for exchange rate volatility 
against the euro (DM) and the dollar respectively. The z-scores as proposed by Ghosh, Gulde and 
Wolf (2003) incorporate both exchange rate fluctuations around a constant level and exchange rate 
fluctuations around a gradual depreciation path. The parameter µ corresponds to the arithmetic 
average of month-to-month percent exchange rate changes of the year t while σ corresponds to the 
standard deviation of the month-to-month percent exchange rate changes of the year t.  
 
2 2
t t t z σ µ + =  
 
The z-scores are calculated using yearly observations between 1994 and 2002 and are reported for 
the euro (DM) in Table 2 and the dollar in Table 3. Exchange rate volatility against the DM and the 
euro (EUVOL) is lowest for the currency board of Estonia and highest for the (now) free floater 
Poland (Table 2). Table 3 shows the declining role of dollar pegging after 1998, which has persisted 
only in Romania and partially in the Latvian SDR currency basket.  
 To compute a measure of both euro (DM) and dollar pegging in Central and Eastern Europe 
we calculated a measure of exchange rate stabilization by averaging the z-scores of dollar and euro 
pegging.
5 The results are reported in Table 4 and provide us with a rough measure of nominal 
                                                 
4   McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) use a similar methodology. 
5   Assuming that the covariance between dollar and euro (DM) is zero. 
  8effective exchange rate stability in Central and Eastern Europe (NOMEFF). We observe that the 
Latvian currency basket now achieves a higher degree of exchange rate stabilization than under the 
two single currency indicators. The rigid pegs of all Baltic countries maintain the highest z-scores 




The sample period from 1994 to 2002 covers two different social and political environments for 
exchange rate stabilization in Central and Eastern Europe. Up to the year 1997 the CEE exchange 
rate strategies were quite heterogeneous and did not follow any consistent formal or informal 
common guideline. While one group of countries—notably the Baltic countries—pursued rigid 
pegs, a second group (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) experienced persistent 
depreciations. The Czech and the Slovak republics exhibited considerable exchange rate 
fluctuations, without a clear trend however.  
  During 1997 and 1998 the social and political circumstances for exchange rate policies in 
Central and Eastern Europe changed in two respects.
6 First, the 1997/98 the financial crises in Asia, 
South America and Central and Eastern Europe made clear that the so-called intermediate exchange 
rate regimes (Fischer 2001) are very fragile. Following IMF recommendations, many emerging 
countries adopted inflation targeting frameworks. Inflation targeting was officially introduced in the 
Czech Republic (1998), Poland (1999), Hungary (2001) and Slovenia (2002) which also coincided 
with the official shift towards flexible exchange rate arrangements.
7  
  Second, in March 1998 the European Union started the official negotiations on EU 
accession with the Luxemburg group (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) 
and in October 1999 with the Helsinki group (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovak 
Republic). The adoption of the Acquis Communautaire by the accession countries incorporated the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies (art. 103, 1 EC Treaty), prohibition of central bank loans to 
the government (art. 104) and the control of government deficits (art. 104c). The approaching EU 
accession provided an informal framework for macroeconomic stabilization that is unique in the 
group of emerging markets. Although EU accession did not impose any direct restrictions on the 
exchange rate strategies, the coordination of macroeconomic policies required low inflation. The 
gradual depreciations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia abated or—at least—slowed 
down.  
                                                 
6   Coricelli and Jazbec (2003) make a similar distinction regarding sub-periods. 
7   Because in small open economies the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to prices is high, in some countries 
exchange rate stabilization persisted (but without any specified target).  
  9Furthermore, anticipating membership in the European Union, exchange rate stabilization 
against the euro gained a more prominent weight for the CEE countries. Bulgaria adopted a DM 
(euro) based currency board in mid 1997, Hungary changed the weight of the euro in its currency 
basket to 100% in January 2002. The Lithuanian currency board switched the reference currency 
from the dollar to the euro in early 2002. Other CEE countries such as the Czech and the Slovak 
Republics announced the euro to be the official intervention currency.  
3.  Exchange Rate Regime and Inflation 
The predominant view on the relationship between the exchange regime and inflation is that pegged 
exchange rates contribute to lower and more stable inflation. For (developing and emerging) 
countries with (comparatively) weak institutional frameworks pegged exchange rates provide an 
important tool to control inflation via both a commitment towards exchange rate stability and a 
disciplining effect on monetary growth (Crocket and Goldstein 1976). For small and open 
economies pegging the nominal exchange rate helps minimizing fluctuations of the domestic price 
level (McKinnon 1963).  
In contrast, in countries with strong institutional frameworks (based on central bank 
independence) low inflation can be achieved without any specific commitment to an explicit 
exchange rate target (Calvo and Mishkin 2003). Recently, inflation targeting frameworks have 
become a widely used tool to achieve price stability in both industrial countries and emerging 
markets. In large (closed) economies inflation targets—which imply freely floating exchange 
rates—will not affect the volatility of inflation as the fraction of traded goods on the aggregate price 
level is comparatively small. In contrast, in smaller (more open) economies exchange rate 
fluctuations might impair price stability and therefore (informal) exchange stabilization might 
persist.  
Table 5 and   show the macroeconomic performance of the CEE countries for the two 
sub-periods as specified in section 3. The countries are ranked according to their z-score for 
monthly exchange rate stability against both euro (DM) and dollar as listed in Table 4. Averages are 
calculated for a group with (relatively) fixed exchange rates and for a group with (relatively) 
flexible exchange rates. 
Table 6
  At first glance, for the first sub-period from 1994 up to 1997 (Table 5) inflation in the 
pegged exchange rates group is considerably lower than in the more flexible group for both 
consumer and wholesale prices. But if the two high inflation countries Romania and Bulgaria are 
removed from the sample, this distinction disappears. Similarly, for the second sub-period, there is 
  10no clear indication that stable exchange rates contribute to lower inflation if the outlier Romania is 
removed from the sample (Table 6).  
Given the complex interdependence among all macroeconomic aggregates such as prices, 
money, interest rates and real growth, this finding is not surprising. Fixed exchange rates might 
contribute to price stability, but other determinants of inflation—such as the dismantling of price 




To identify the effect of exchange rate policies and inflation targeting on the level of inflation we 
specify a cross-country panel model for the period 1994-2002. The basic framework for the analysis 
is a monetary model of inflation, in which inflation is determined by the growth rates of money 
(MON) and output (GDP). We include in this model the indicators for exchange rate stability (PEG, 
IMD, EUVOL, NOMEFF) and introduce dummies for inflation targeting (TARGET). 
Starting from this baseline model, we add a considerable number of control variables which 
can influence the impact of the exchange rate stability on inflation. These control variables can be 
sub-dived into domestic and external variables. The domestic control variables are central bank 
independence (INDEP), short-term capital inflows as percent of GDP (CAPGAP) and current 
budget deficits as percent of GDP (DEF). The external control variables are a dummy for the 1998 
financial crisis (CRISIS), EMU consumer price inflation
8   (CPIEMU) and EU real growth 
(GDPEU). If control variables remained insignificant for all estimations and robustness checks they 
were removed from the estimating equation to save degrees of freedom.
9 This yields the following 
specification: 
 
  it i it i it x y ε β α + + = '            ( 1 )  
 
where yit is the vector of cross-country inflation rates over the period 1994 - 2002. The regressors 
are denoted by xit which include the indicators of exchange rate stability, domestic control variables 
and external control variables and εit is the error term.  
   A major issue concerning the specification of equation (1) is the existence of a possible 
endogeneity bias. As it stands, equation (1) assumes that the causality runs from the exchange rate 
regime to the rate of inflation. There is, however, also a potential reverse causality, i.e. countries 
                                                 
8   Alternatively inflation in the US. 
9   Central bank independence, short-term capital inflows, budget deficits and EMU inflation. 
  11with low inflation are more likely to adopt pegged exchange rates. Conversely, in countries with 
high inflation the probability of adopting fixed exchange rates is low.  
  We address the endogeneity issue by estimating a GMM model as proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). This GMM model uses the full set of valid lags of all endogenous and exogenous 
variables as instruments. The exchange rate stability indicators, the dummy for inflation targeting, 
money supply, real growth, and absolute interest rates changes are assumed to be subject to an 
endogeneity bias. Real EU growth and the dummy for 1998 crisis
10 are assumed to be exogenous. In 
addition, we introduce openness
11, export concentration to EU15, as well as volatility of foreign 
reserves as instrumental variables, which are assumed to be correlated with exchange rate volatility 
but not with inflation.  
   
Estimation Results 
 
Following Gosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003: 75-106) the estimation process is first based on de jure 
exchange rate classifications. It includes dummies for pegged (PEG) and intermediate (IMD) 
exchange rate regimes with floating regimes as the excluded category. In this specification negative 
coefficients of the dummies indicate lower average inflation in comparison to flexible regimes. 
Positive coefficients indicate higher inflation. In a second and third step the dummies for de jure 
exchange rate stability are substituted by the z-scores for de facto exchange rate exchange rate 
stability. “De facto I” indicates exchange rate stability against the euro (DM) (EUVOL). “De facto 
II” indicates exchange rate stability against both euro (DM) and dollar, which can be interpreted as 
a simple measure of nominal effective exchange rate stability (NOMEFF). Positive coefficients 
indicate that pegged exchange rates (lower volatility) are associated with less inflation.  
The results are reported in Table 7. For the whole observation period (1994-2002) we find that 
the  de jure measures of exchange rate volatility are not significant. The dummy for inflation 
targeting is negative suggesting that inflation targeting lowers inflation. But the level of significance 
is low.
12   The other coefficients have the expected sign although only real growth—which 
contributes to less inflation—and money—which contributes to more inflation—are significant at 
the common levels. 
The results of the estimations based on de facto exchange rate variability against the euro (DM) 
and against an average of the euro and the dollar are presented in the second and third columns of 
                                                 
10   To this end we interpret the crisis as contagion from other crisis regions in East Asia and Latin America.  
11  Openness also includes country size, which can be assumed to correlated with exchange rate stability, but not 
inflation. 
12   In the baseline GLS estimation the dummy for inflation targeting was negative and significant at the 5% level.  
  12Table 7 (de facto I and de facto II). We find that these two measures of de facto exchange rate 
stability have a strong and very significant impact on inflation. Exchange stability against the euro 
(DM) and the dollar contributes to a lower level of inflation. The other coefficients keep the 
expected signs. Thus, the first step of our estimation suggests that in Central and Eastern Europe 
exchange rate pegs contributed significantly to lower inflation during 1994-2002.  
  For reasons discussed in the previous section we check for structural breaks in the estimated 
equation. The change in the social and political environment that occurred around 1998 may cause 
shifts in the coefficients of the indicators of exchange rate stability. In particular, since 1998 with 
inflation converging towards the EMU level, the correlation between exchange rate stability and 
inflation may be less evident.  
  To control for different impacts of the exchange rate regime on the level of inflation in 
different time periods we introduce dummies for the pre-EU accession period (PERIOD1) from 
1994 to 1997 and the EU accession period from 1998 to 2002 (PERIOD2).  In the new model the 
variables of exchange rate stability are multiplied by these two period dummies. For the inflation 
targeting this distinction is not made, because it emerged only during the second sub-period.  
  The results are reported in the lower panel of Table 7 (two periods model). We observe that 
for the de jure dummies the coefficients have the expected sign, but remain insignificant for both 
periods. For the de facto measures of exchange rate volatility we observe a structural break: While 
in the pre-EU accession period the coefficients of exchange rate stability have the right sign and are 
highly significant, in the second period these coefficients cease to be statistically significant. 
  We also tested the robustness of our results by eliminating the outliers. As found by Ghosh, 
Gulde and Wolf (2003), the impact of the exchange rate regime on inflation is very significant for 
high inflation countries, but for low inflation countries the evidence is weak. In our CEE sample, 
during the first sub-period Bulgaria experienced very high (hyper) inflation which coincided with 
the fast depreciation of the Bulgarian lev. While in the second sub-period most CEE countries 
including Bulgaria achieved macroeconomic stabilization, in Romania considerable inflation and 
strong depreciations persisted.  
  To control for possible bias caused by the two outliers we eliminated Bulgaria and Romania 
from our panel and re-estimated the model. We present the results in Table 8. One of the more 
striking results is that for the whole period we fail to find a significant effect of exchange rate 
stability on inflation for both the de jure and the de facto measures.
13  
  In the two periods model there is a significant impact of exchange rate stability on inflation 
for the de facto I measure (exchange rate stability against the euro) during the first sub-period. 
                                                 
13   In addition the estimation process for the de jure regimes gets unstable dropping the coefficient for pegged regimes. 
  13During the second period the coefficient becomes negative for both measures of de facto exchange 
rate stability suggesting that exchange rate stability is associated with higher inflation. This is in 
line with De Grauwe and Schnabl (2003). The intuition is that in countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes such as Estonia or Lithuania, the Balassa-Samuelson effect contributes to higher inflation. 
In countries with more flexible rates such as Poland or the Czech Republic, the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect can be adjusted by nominal appreciation leading to a lower level of inflation. As a result, 
inflation targeting frameworks are associated with lower inflation (negative coefficient).
14 
4.  Exchange Rate Regime and Output Growth 
 
There is an important literature on the effect of the exchange rate regime on economic growth. On 
the whole this literature is inconclusive. The main reason is that there are theoretical channels 
highlighting a positive effect of exchange rate stability on growth and others that stress the negative 
repercussions of exchange rate pegs on output expansion. 
  Proponents of fixed exchange rates have argued that stable exchange rates foster economic 
growth by promoting macroeconomic stability, in particular in small open economies.  McKinnon 
and Schnabl (2003) argue for East Asia that—up to the Asian crisis—exchange rate stability against 
the US dollar contributed to low and stable inflation as well as to sound government finance. The 
resulting stable expectations in turn promoted investment and long-term growth (the East Asian 
miracle).  
One can identify two reasons why exchange rate stability promotes higher economic growth.  
First, the elimination of foreign exchange risk stimulates international trade and thereby the 
international division of labour. While the evidence for the positive impact of exchange rate 
stability on trade has remained mixed (European Commission 1990, IMF 1984), recently, Frankel 
and Rose (2002) have found a strong positive impact of irrevocably fixed exchange rates on trade 
and income in the context of a monetary union. Second, credible fixed exchange rate regimes create 
an environment of macroeconomic stability thereby reducing the risk premium embedded in the real 
interest rate. The resulting lower long-term interest rates stimulate investment, consumption and 
growth (Dornbusch 2001).  
In contrast to this view, Meade (1951) and Friedman (1953) have argued that under flexible 
exchange rates countries can adjust to real shocks more easily. Under fixed exchange rate regimes 
real exchange rate adjustments must be carried out through relative price changes, which in a world 
of price rigidities is slow and costly. This may create an excessive burden on the economy leading 
to low economic growth.  
                                                 
14   Note that the negative coefficients are insignificant at the common levels, however. 
  14Furthermore, the recent experience of currency crises has highlighted the costs of maintaining 
exchange rate pegs under free capital mobility (Fischer 2001). Less than fully credible pegs become 
victims of speculative attacks and painful recessions when the pegs collapse.  Even if the peg can be 
defended in times of crisis the costs in terms of rising interest rates are high. As a result, flexible 
exchange rates constitute a more appropriate regime to avoid crises and to achieve stable long-term 
growth.  
  Since economic theory does not allow us to make precise predictions, the question of 
whether exchange rate stability leads to more or less economic growth is essentially an empirical 
matter. Not surprisingly, since the theory is inconclusive, empirical studies have also come to 
different conclusions. Comparing growth in industrial countries during and after the Bretton-Woods 
System, Mundell (1995) finds faster growth in times of exchange rate stability. Bailliu, Lafrance 
and Perrault (2003) argue that intermediate and flexible exchange rates are detrimental for growth. 
The GLS estimation by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) yields a weak relationship between the 
exchange rate regime and growth.  
  In contrast, the panel estimation by Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) finds evidence that 
countries with more flexible exchange rates grow faster. Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) reveal a 
strong negative relationship between the exchange rate regime and growth for 12 countries over 120 
years. They conclude that the results of such estimations strongly depend on the time period and the 
sample. 
  We are interested in the impact of the exchange regime on the growth rates of the CEE 
countries during their transition towards the European Union. Table 5 and Table 6 show the average 
yearly GDP growth rates in the CEE countries. As in section 4, the sample is subdivided in two 
groups, one with relatively fixed and one with relatively flexible exchange rates. We use the z-score 
of average exchange rate volatility against both euro (DM) and dollar. We find some evidence of a 
higher average growth in the group with relatively fixed exchange rate arrangements. This result 




To provide better evidence of the impact of the exchange rate regime on growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe we use a panel data model that explains economic growth by standard variables 
from the growth literature to which we add the measures of exchange rate stability.
15 This yields the 
following regression equation: 
                                                 
15   See Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) for a similar approach 
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where wit is the vector of yearly real growth rates during  1994-2002 in the CEE-countries. The 
explanatory variables vit consist of the indicators of exchange rate stability and a set of control 
variables. These control variables are the ratio of investment to GDP (INVGDP), the growth rate of 
dollar exports (EXPGR), the budget deficit as percent of GDP (DEF), short-term capital inflows as 
percent of GDP (CAPGDP), and real growth of the EU15. Furthermore, we include dummies for 





The results of estimating the growth equation (2) are reported in Table 9.
17 We find that the de jure 
exchange rate stability variables have a weak and mostly insignificant effect on economic growth. 
This contrasts with the results obtained with the de facto exchange rate stability variable. The 
coefficients of the de facto exchange rate measures have both negative signs and are highly 
significant at the 1% level. This result holds for the whole period and for the two sub-periods. Thus, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that exchange rate stability promotes economic growth in the CEE 
economies.  Our findings for the CEE countries appear to be stronger than in the all-country sample 
of Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) and are in stark contrast with the findings of Edwards and Levy-
Yeyati (2003).  
  In contrast with the results of the previous section, we do not find evidence that inflation 
targeting contributed to more growth in the CEE countries. The other control variables have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant.  We also performed an estimation of the panel data 
model excluding the outliers, Romania and Bulgaria (Table 10). On the whole our main conclusion 
that exchange rate stability (measured by de facto stability) has promoted economic growth in the 
CEE-countries is maintained. This conclusion seems to be rather robust.  
5.  Conclusion 
 
What do our findings mean for the new member states in the European Union? With the accession 
to the European Union, the CEE countries moved from a period of macroeconomic instability to a 
more stable macroeconomic environment.  
                                                 
16   Control variables which represent workers education are less important for our sample, because they can be assumed 
to be by and large the same for the observation period and all countries. 
17  We perform a standard GLS estimation as the concern for a possible endogeneity bias is small. 
  16  Our estimations of the impact of the exchange rate regime on economic growth suggest that 
exchange rate fixity does not reduce economic growth in the CEE countries. On the contrary, by 
fixing exchange rates to the euro, the CEE countries can reap the benefits of more trade (Frankel 
and Rose 2002) and lower interest rates (Dornbusch 2001). The view that the entry in the Eurozone 
will put constraints on the growth potential of the CEE countries is not warranted. The evidence 
also shows that for these small open economies stabilizing exchange rates has been a source of 
macroeconomic stability. The Mundell II framework seems to be the right one to think about the 
desirability of joining the Eurozone.  
  This does not mean that the Mundell I framework has become irrelevant. There are still risks 
involved for the CEE countries when they join EMU. These risks arise because of the possibility of 
future large asymmetric shocks. Our results, however, suggest that against these risks there is the 
high growth potential that the CEE countries are likely to enjoy in EMU. All this leads to some 
optimism about the benefits of monetary union for the new member states.   
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Source: IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics.  
  
  22Table 1: De jure Exchange Rate Arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Bulgaria  3 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Czech  Rep. 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Hungary  3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 
Latvia  n.a.  n.a. 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Lithuania  n.a.  n.a. 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Poland  3 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 
Romania  3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 
Slovak  Rep. 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Slovenia  n.a.  n.a. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Source: IMF (various issues).  
1: exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender 
2: currency board arrangements 
3: other conventional fixed peg arrangements (within a band of most ±1%) 
4: pegged exchange rate arrangements within horizontal bands (at least ±1%) 
5: crawling pegs (with small, pre-announced adjustment) 
6: exchange rates with crawling bands  
7: managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate 
8: independent floating (market-determined exchange rate and independent monetary policy)  
 
Table 2: Z-Score for Monthly Exchange Rate Changes against the DM (€) 
  BUL CZE EST HUN LAT LIT POL ROM SLK SLO 
1990            
1991            
1992  3.10%     1.74%    3.95% 14.64%   7.60%
1993  13.58%   0.00%  1.93% 4.48% 10.01% 3.63% 8.44%   2.14%
1994  16.01% 0.75% 0.00% 2.56% 1.53% 2.11% 2.18% 7.18% 0.88% 0.77%
1995  2.81% 0.97% 0.00% 3.89% 1.47% 2.81% 2.22% 4.98% 1.32% 1.11%
1996  26.49% 0.81% 0.00% 1.07% 1.30% 1.54% 1.20% 3.69% 0.63% 0.84%
1997  67.67% 2.12% 0.00% 1.17% 1.86% 2.49% 1.71% 12.91% 1.18% 0.67%
1998  0.00% 1.86% 0.00% 1.88% 1.74% 2.27% 4.66% 4.25% 2.55% 0.50%
1999  0.00% 1.72% 0.00% 0.85% 1.73% 2.19% 2.40% 4.53% 1.50% 0.63%
2000  0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.44% 2.19% 3.04% 2.03% 3.41% 1.47% 0.65%
2001  0.00% 1.09% 0.00% 1.78% 1.63% 2.39% 3.29% 3.01% 1.46% 0.49%
2002  0.00% 1.94% 0.00% 1.27% 1.38% 0.69% 2.59% 2.45% 1.89% 0.54%
94-97*  31.39% 1.30% 0.00% 2.11% 1.58% 2.24% 2.39% 6.60% 1.31% 0.78%
98-02* 0.00% 1.44% 0.00% 1.09% 1.73% 2.08% 2.58% 3.35% 1.58% 0.58%
Source: IMF: IFS. DM represents the euro starting in 1999. * arithmetic average. 
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Table 3: Z-Score for Monthly Exchange Rate Changes against the Dollar 
 BUL  CZE  EST  HUN  LAT  LIT  POL  ROM  SLK  SLO 
1990            
1991            
1992       1.79%     4.77% 12.12%    9.25%
1993  14.43%   2.52%  2.43% 4.24% 9.31% 3.03% 9.19%   3.66%
1994 16.05%  1.23% 1.89%  2.24% 1.34% 0.56% 1.47% 7.11%  1.09% 1.96%
1995 0.00%  1.85% 2.78%  2.31% 1.97% 0.00% 1.44% 4.14%  1.69% 2.85%
1996 27.32%  1.39% 1.27%  1.58% 1.05% 0.00% 1.30% 3.90%  1.13% 1.96%
1997 71.97%  2.99% 2.56%  2.32% 1.34% 0.00% 2.37% 14.89%  1.64% 2.54%
1998 2.28%  2.81% 2.18%  1.41% 1.38% 0.00% 3.74% 3.19%  1.41% 2.26%
1999 2.17%  3.40% 2.21%  2.09% 1.10% 0.00% 2.95% 5.95%  2.94% 2.52%
2000 3.08%  3.30% 3.07%  3.20% 1.18% 0.00% 3.16% 3.13%  4.09% 3.40%
2001 2.37%  2.06% 2.32%  2.15% 1.22% 0.00% 2.36% 1.81%  1.44% 2.39%
2002 2.18%  3.17% 2.17%  2.32% 1.39% 2.09% 1.91% 0.95%  1.92% 2.08%
94-97* 33.85%  2.05% 2.19%  1.97% 1.42% 0.11% 2.06% 6.64%  1.39% 2.31%
98-02* 2.45% 2.98% 2.44% 2.44% 1.23% 0.52% 2.59% 2.96% 2.60% 2.60%




Table 4: Z-Score for Monthly Exchange Rate Changes against DM (€) and $* 
  BUL CZE EST HUN LAT LIT POL  ROM SLK SLO 
1990            
1991            
1992  1.55%     1.77%    4.36% 13.38%   4.63%
1993  14.01%   1.26%  2.18% 4.36% 9.66% 3.33% 8.81%   1.83%
1994  16.03% 0.99% 0.94% 2.40% 1.44% 1.34% 1.82% 7.14% 0.98% 1.37%
1995  1.40% 1.41% 1.39% 3.10% 1.72% 1.40% 1.83% 4.56% 1.50% 1.98%
1996  26.90% 1.10% 0.63% 1.33% 1.17% 0.77% 1.25% 3.79% 0.88% 1.40%
1997  69.82% 2.56% 1.28% 1.74% 1.60% 1.24% 2.04% 13.90% 1.41% 1.60%
1998  1.14% 2.34% 1.09% 1.64% 1.56% 1.14% 4.20% 3.72% 1.98% 1.38%
1999  1.08% 2.56% 1.11% 1.47% 1.42% 1.09% 2.67% 5.24% 2.22% 1.57%
2000  1.54% 2.15% 1.53% 1.82% 1.68% 1.52% 2.60% 3.27% 2.78% 2.02%
2001  1.18% 1.58% 1.16% 1.97% 1.43% 1.19% 2.83% 2.41% 1.45% 1.44%
2002  1.09% 2.55% 1.08% 1.80% 1.39% 1.39% 2.25% 1.70% 1.90% 1.31%
94-97*  23.06% 1.68% 1.07% 2.04% 1.50% 1.18% 2.23% 6.62% 1.35% 1.54%
98-02* 1.22% 2.21% 1.22% 1.76% 1.48% 1.30% 2.59% 3.15% 2.09% 1.59%
Source: IMF: IFS. DM represents the euro starting in 1999. * arithmetic average. 
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Table 5: Exchange Rate Regime and Macroeconomic Performance 1994-1997 
 MB  MON  INT  WPI  CPI  EXP  GDP 
EST  22.85% 28.07%  5.15%  16.25% 27.52% 39.23%  4.00% 
LIT 28.43%  31.92%  31.51%  23.65% 36.33% 18.38% 13.44% 
SLK  25.39% 9.61%  –  6.90%  8.80% 11.77% 5.78% 
LAT  18.81% 21.37% 19.10% 11.63% 21.74% 14.52%  2.97% 
SLO  30.20% 24.12% 16.24% 10.85% 13.18%  8.68%  4.43% 
Average 1  25.14% 23.02% 18.00% 13.86% 21.51% 18.52%  6.12% 
CZE  22.12%  13.58%  13.44% 5.63%  9.12% 12.72% 2.92% 
HUN  9.34%  14.42% 25.77% 20.73% 22.26% 20.98%  2.58% 
POL  30.53% 33.44% 23.05% 20.25% 24.05% 16.53%  6.27% 
ROM  82.91%  72.78%  –  95.6% 90.65%  15.21% 2.24% 
BUL  256.47% 280.55%  76.46%  576.64% 334.53%  10.27%  -1.66% 
Average 2  70.27%  82.95%  34.68% 143.77% 96.12%  15.14%  2.47% 
Average 2*  20.66% 20.48% 20.75% 15.54% 18.48% 16.74%  3.92% 
Source: IMF: IFS. * Excluding Bulgaria and Romania. Yearly data. MB = monetary base, MON = 
money, INT = short-term (money market) interest rate, WPI = wholesale price index, CPI = 
consumer price index, EXP = dollar exports, GDP = growth rate of real GDP. Arithmetic averages. 
 
Table 6: Exchange Rate Regime and Macroeconomic Performance 1998-2002 
 MB  MON  INT  WPI  CPI  EXP  GDP 
EST  7.34%  15.02%  6.38% 2.54% 4.97% 3.30% 4.74% 
BUL  15.15%  17.99%  2.93% 8.46% 8.95% 3.75% 3.98% 
LIT  10.09%  10.73%  4.31% 0.84% 1.69% 8.90% 4.56% 
LAT  11.54%  13.23%  4.07% 0.23% 2.28% 6.49% 5.69% 
SLO  15.32%  24.97%  6.62% 5.97% 7.77% 2.59% 3.90% 
Average 1  11.89%  313.78%  4.86% 3.61% 5.13% 5.01% 4.57% 
HUN  14.29%  16.65%  12.65% 6.12%  9.70% 12.58% 4.27% 
SLK  8.54% 8.84%  –  5.11% 7.99%  12.31%  3.04% 
CZE  -1.26%  15.50%  5.68% 2.62% 4.63%  11.04%  1.54% 
POL  7.13% 13.36%  15.59% 4.66%  7.31%  9.91%  5.46% 
ROM  56.50% 36.68% 15.81% 39.36% 41.51% 10.90%  1.35% 
Average 2  17.04% 18.21% 12.43% 11.57% 14.23% 11.35%  3.13% 
Average 2*  7.19%  13.66%  9.17% 4.62% 7.44%  11.98%  2.95% 
Source: IMF: IFS. * Excluding Romania. Yearly data. MB = monetary base, MON = money, INT = 
short-term (money market) interest rate, WPI = wholesale price index, CPI = consumer price index, 
EXP = dollar exports, GDP = growth rate of real GDP. Arithmetic averages. 
  25Table 7: Arelleano-Bond Panel Estimation for Inflation – All Countries 
10 Countries  de jure  de facto I  de facto II 
One  Period  Model  coeff. z-stat coeff. z-stat coeff. z-stat 
CPI  (lags)  -0.005  -0.25 0.007 0.42 0.010 0.66 
PEG  0.138  0.75      
IMD  -0.088  -0.88      
EUVOL     2.281**  2.59     
NOMEFF         4.870***  4.68 
TARGET  -0.068 -0.68 -0.023 -0.26 -0.017 -0.20 
GDP -1.112***  -2.84  -0.684*  -1.73  -0.243  -0.66 
MON  1.140*** 52.22 0.994*** 15.14 0.815*** 10.79 
GDPEU  2.000 0.61 3.950 1.34 2.855 1.04 
CRISIS  0.108 1.19 0.041 0.51 0.035 0.48 
C -0.092  0.08  -0.122*  -1.71  -0.094  -1.42 
Observations  70  70  70  
Sargan, AR(2)   0.00  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.24  0.18 
        
Two Periods Model  coeff.  z-stat  coeff.  z-stat  coeff.  z-stat 
CPI  (lags)  -0.005  -0.28 0.008 0.46 0.011 0.71 
PEG  94-97  -0.015  -0.06      
PEG  98-02  0.138  0.74      
IMD  94-97  -0.132  -1.07      
IMD  98-02  -0.062  -0.58      
EUVOL 94-97      2.231**  2.52     
EUVOL 98-02      1.513  0.51     
NOMEFF 94-97          4.814***  4.58 
NOMEFF 98-02          4.365  1.20 
TARGET  -0.064 -0.63 -0.028 -0.30 -0.028 -0.33 
GDP -1.037**  -2.57  -0.669*  -1.67  -0.211  -0.57 
MON    1.156*** 40.71 0.997*** 15.11 0.820*** 10.69 
GDPEU    1.728 0.52 4.010 1.34 2.917 0.99 
CRISIS  0.050 0.46 0.053 0.56 0.038 0.45 
C -0.089  -1.14  -0.122*  -1.70  -0.094  -1.34 
Observations  70  70  70  
Sargan,  AR(2)  0.01 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.21 
Source: IMF: IFS. Yearly data. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. Sargan corresponds to Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions (p-value). AR(2) = Arellano-Bond test that average covariance in residuals of 
order 2 is zero (p-value). 
 
  26Table 8: Arelleano-Bond Panel Estimation for Inflation – Bulgaria & Romania excluded 
8 Countries  de jure  de facto I  de facto II 
One  Period  Model  coeff. z-stat coeff. z-stat coeff. z-stat 
CPI  (lags)  0.619***  9.83  0.615*** 11.14 0.614*** 11.12 
PEG  dropped  dropped      
IMD  0.005*  0.26      
EUVOL     0.183  0.34     
NOMEFF         -0.163  -0.19 
TARGET  -0.017 -1.17 -0.013 -0.95 -0.156 -1.09 
GDP  -0.032 -0.40 -0.048 -0.65 -0.033 -0.46 
MON  -0.061* -1.83 -0.060* -1.86 -0.060* -1.85 
GDPEU  0.948  1.67 0.944* 1.77 0.954* 1.68 
CRISIS  -0.002 -0.15 -0.004 -0.26 -0.001 -0.08 
C -0.025*  -1.88  -0.025**  -1.96  -0.026*  -1.90 
Observations  56  56  56  
Sargan,  AR(2)  0.32 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.28 
        
Two Periods Model  coeff.  z-stat  coeff.  z-stat  coeff.  z-stat 
CPI  (lags)  0.679***  8.81  0.596*** 10.77 0.614*** 10.64 
PEG  94-97  -0.019  -0.54      
PEG  98-02  dropped  dropped      
IMD  94-97  0.031  1.25      
IMD  98-02  -0.002  -0.11      
EUVOL 94-97      1.852**  2.37     
EUVOL 98-02      -0.249  -0.43     
NOMEFF 94-97          1.453  1.07 
NOMEFF 98-02          -0.110  -0.13 
TARGET  -0.007 -0.47 -0.005 -0.35 -0.104 -0.68 
GDP  -0.031 0.08 -0.052 -0.70 -0.040 -0.51 
MON   -0.080**  -2.27  -0.072**  -2.21  -0.062*  -1.83 
GDPEU    1.084* 1.87 0.979* 1.81 0.958* 1.61 
CRISIS  0.007 0.30 0.016 1.02 0.153 0.86 
C  -0.026**  -1.92 -0.025* -1.92 -0.024* -1.76 
Observations  56  56  56  
Sargan,  AR(2)  0.70 0.98 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.16 
Source: IMF: IFS. Yearly data. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. Sargan = Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value). 
AR(2) = Arellano-Bond test that average covariance in residuals of order 2 is zero (p-value). 
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10 countries  de jure  de facto I  de facto II 
One Period Model  coeff.  t-stat coeff. t-stat  coeff. t-stat 
C 0.020  1.53  0.035***   6.04 0.03 ***  7   6.19 
PEG  -0.004  -0.34      
IMD  0.0190***  4.72      
EUVOL     -0.174***   -30.37    
NOMEFF         -0.173***  -27.70 
INVGDP  0.003 0.06 0.002 0.08 0.002 0.06 
EXPGR  0.056**  2.38 0.058*** 3.42 0.054*** 3.22 
DEF  0.434*** 4.38 0.298*** 9.16 0.311*** 9.53 
CAPGDP  0.150*** 3.35 0.164*** 4.43 0.160*** 4.38 
TARGET  0.005  1.11  -0.001 -0.29 -0.001 -0.33 
CRISIS  -0.013**  -2.07 -0.010* -1.73 -0.011* -1.88 
GDPEU 0.349***  2.92  0.132  1.37  0.154*  1.63 
Observations, R
2 adj.  83 0.36 83 0.60 83 0.61 
        
Two Periods Model  coeff.  t-stat  coeff.  t-stat  coeff.  t-stat 
PEG  94-97  -0.057*  -1.92      
PEG  98-02  -0.004  -0.44      
IMD  94-97  0.012**  2.28      
IMD  98-02  -0.001  -0.09      
EUVOL 94-97      -0.143*** -24.22     
EUVOL 98-02      -1.187*** -7.23     
NOMEFF 94-97          -0.155***  -33.17 
NOMEFF 98-02          -0.762***  -7.98 
INVGDP  0.348*** 6.49 0.332*** 8.86 0.270*** 7.60 
EXPGR  0.088*** 7.27 0.064*** 5.49 0.061*** 5.19 
DEF  0.443***  5.40  0.344*** 12.67 0.384*** 17.74 
CAPGDP  0.115*** 3.97 0.091*** 3.90 0.088*** 4.14 
TARGET  0.016*** 4.92 0.016*** 4.55 0.013*** 4.64 
CRISIS -0.021***  -5.26  -0.008*  -1.87  -0.013***  -3.64 
GDPEU  0.305*** 3.23 0.323*** 3.48 0.411*** 4.93 
Fixed Effects        
BUL -0.034    -0.024    -0.008   
CZE   -0.104    -0.085    -0.065   
EST -0.050    -0.069    -0.047   
HUN -0.048    -0.033    -0.017   
LAT -0.037    -0.016    -0.008   
LIT  0.045  0.041  0.045  
POL -0.038    -0.008    -0.001   
ROM -0.057    -0.027    -0.023   
SLK -0.077    -0.058    -0.039   
SLO -0.050    -0.042    -0.025   
Observations, R
2 adj.  83 0.57 83 0.75 83 0.70 
Source: IMF: IFS. Yearly data. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** 
significant at the 1% level. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 
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8 countries  de jure  de facto I  de facto II 
One Period Model  coeff.  t-stat coeff. t-stat  coeff. t-stat 
C 0.066***  8.99 0.059*** 6.945302 0.073***  8.85 
PEG 0.008  0.55    
IMD 0.014***  3.47    
EUVOL     0.377 1.36  
NOMEFF     -1.04***  -2.92
INVGDP -0.149***  -4.11 -0.105** -2.43 -0.100***  -2.74
EXPGR 0.001  0.09 0.014 0.63 0.020  0.87
DEF 0.320**  2.15 0.306*** 2.85 0.103  1.03
CAPGDP 0.159***  3.22 0.186*** 3.62 0.170***  3.47
TARGET -0.002  -0.50 -0.007 -1.42 -0.004  -0.97
CRISIS -0.004  -0.89 -0.006 -1.07 -0.003  -0.69
GDPEU 0.330**  2.42 0.237* 1.68 0.340**  2.54
Observations, R
2 adj.  65 0.28 65 0.33 65 0.29 
        
Two Periods Model             
PEG  94-97        
PEG  98-02        
IMD  94-97        
IMD  98-02        
EUVOL 94-97      0.507 0.89    
EUVOL 98-02      -0.885*** -3.39    
NOMEFF 94-97      -0.465*  -1.71
NOMEFF 98-02      -1.10***  -5.84
INVGDP     0.380*** 4.03 0.261***  4.17
EXPGR     0.050* 1.84 0.044**  2.03
DEF     0.631*** 3.45 0.451***  3.16
CAPGDP     0.067 1.61 0.072**  2.18
TARGET     0.021** 2.43 0.013***  2.62
CRISIS     -0.017*** -3.02 -0.014***  -2.62
GDPEU     0.541*** 3.54 0.502***  4.09
Fixed Effects        
BUL        
CZE       -0.105 -0.056   
EST     -0.084 -0.040   
HUN     -0.039 -0.005   
LAT     -0.031 0.000   
LIT     0.029 0.055   
POL     -0.028 0.010   
ROM        
SLK     -0.070 -0.028   
SLO     -0.058 -0.018   
Observations, R
2 adj.     65 0.58 65 0.49 
Source: IMF: IFS. Yearly data. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** 
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Data 
 
Macroeconomic data on exchange rate rates, CPI inflation, WPI inflation, foreign reserves, 
monetary base, money, nominal interest rates, dollar exports, foreign reserves and short-term capital 
flows are monthly data from IMF International Financial Statistics. Real GDP are quarterly data 
from the same source. Volatilities are computed as yearly standard deviations of month-to-month 
percentage changes. By calculating yearly standard deviations we loose a considerable number of 
observations in comparison to quarterly or monthly data, but we avoid possible bias caused by 
computing moving standard deviations of overlapping monthly or quarterly percentage change 
rates. 
  Openness is calculated as the nominal trade (exports plus imports) divided by nominal GDP 
(yearly values). A dummy for inflation targeting (TARGET) is computed according to the official 
statements about the adoption of inflation targeting frameworks by the respective central banks. The 
dummy for central bank independence (INDEP) is constructed based on the day when the respective 
central banks became officially independent. An alternative measure of central bank independence 
is taken from Cuikerman, Miller and Neyapti (2002). The dummy for the speculative crisis which 
hit Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Asian crisis is introduced for the year 1998 
for the countries affected by speculative attacks. 
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